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Abstract:  
 
Purpose: The aim of the paper is to present an original concept of measuring the degree of 
protectionism (DP) by constructing a synthetic measure of DP on the basis of the Technique 
for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS). Owing to application of 
TOPSIS method, another goal was achieved in ranking and classifying EU member states in 
terms of degree of protectionism. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: In the study of TOPSIS method, which is a multi-criteria 
decision-making method that allowed to measure the degree of protectionism, EU member 
states were investigated. 
Findings:  The results reveal that EU countries were not strongly diversified as regards to 
DP level (with some exception of Germany and The Netherlands). Furthermore, no EU 
member states can be qualified as purely liberal nor fully protectionist. The results of the 
study referring to top protectionist countries reveal some similarities to the results of other 
classifications based on different methodology. 
Practical implications: The outcomes of the study might be used by decision-makers in terms 
of commercial policy, both at the EU institutional level as well as outside this framework - by 
EU trade partners. Ranking might also serve as an instrument for boosting commercial 
policy and practices promoting further trade liberalization. 
Originality/Value: Although there are plenty of papers on protectionism, so far there is no 
universally accepted method of measuring the phenomenon. Furthermore, the majority of 
studies focus on tariffs only or selected trade instruments, what brings the risk of 
underestimation of degree of protectionism, as countries use plenty of different measures in 
this respect. Thus, in our paper a new approach was proposed. The application of TOPSIS 
method with data extracted from Global Trade Alert that provides comprehensive list of all 
diverse trade policy interventions. The paper contains an original authors’ concept of 
measuring DP, which might be also applied to comparisons of EU member states with other 
countries, thus the paper will contribute to the development of literature. 
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Considering the evolution of the world trade and economy, it is worth recalling that 
international economy was entering the XXth century with the freest flow of goods, 
services, and capital in human history. Although the previous century had witnessed 
expansion of global output and trade, and rising living standards, an abrupt 
disruption of trading and financial ties took place more than once: during the First 
World War, the Great Depression, and the Second World War. Since then, there has 
been an unprecedented revival of global integration, supported by technical change, 
and by international economic policies within multilateral cooperation that resulted 
in greatly reduced barriers to international flows, further acceleration in the growth 
rate of world output, the reduction of poverty and improved living standards 
(Krueger, 2006).  
 
Although significant progress has been made in the liberalization of international 
trade, further development cannot be taken for granted. The first two decades of 
XXIst century already witnessed vast disruptions considering global crisis of 2008 
and the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic. In such circumstances, concerns that 
protectionist pressures will be strengthened, leading to wreckage the progress made 
in the past are justifiable. Thus, there is a need to track and measure protectionism 
pressure. However, measuring protectionism is challenging considering only plenty 
of different kinds of measures that countries implement within commercial policy.  
 
Therefore, the aim of the paper is to present an original concept of measuring the 
degree of protectionism that covers all interventions. In our study we focused on 
European Union member states, considering EU’s share in international trade. The 
results indicate that EU member states were not strongly diversified as regards to 
degree of protectionism level, however with some exceptions - regarding more 
protectionist trade in Germany and the most liberal trade of the Netherlands. 
 
2. Protectionism in the European Union 
 
EU is the most important trading partner for around 80 economies (WTO, 2019). 
Together with the highest world share of trade in goods3 - at the level of 34.2% in 
relation to export and 33.5% in relation to import in 2018 - the European Union 
trade policy is by no means accidentally a spotlight of analysis. However, the share 
of EU trade in the world export and import is on a decline: in 2003 the share of EU-
25 in the world export/import was 42.8 and 42% respectively (WTO, 2019b). This 
numbers do not automatically mean that there is a premise for more protectionism, 
but yet, EU was already accused for “harmful lobbyism and protectionism” 
(Svendsen, 2003) and that “market protectionist tendencies are clearly present in 
the EU” (Böröcz, 2009), especially within Common Agriculture Policy, “a system 
 
3This share includes both intra- and extra-EU trade, and such data will be used in this paper, 
as protectionism in the EU refers both to intra-EU as well as extra-EU trade. 
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of protectionism aimed at giving advantages to EU produce over imported produce” 
(McCormick, 2017). Indeed, considering simple average MFN applied in 2019 one 
can notice essential predominance of tariffs on agriculture products (average tariff 
was 14.2%) versus the non-agriculture products (average tariff was 4.2%). As an 
average has many shortcomings, it is reasonable to add that the tariff range was 
between 0 and 171.6% with lower share of duty-free lines in case of agricultural 
products than in case of non-agricultural ones.  
 
On the other hand, much was done within, first EEC, and then EU to liberalize trade; 
this effort should not be neglected also considering the very beginning of European 
integration. With the creation of GATT and OECD in the 1940s under which trade 
liberalization in Europe took place, the European Economic Community was created 
by the Treaty of Rome in a climate of trade liberalization. Indeed, trade in goods was 
the core of trade liberalization efforts in 1950s within EEC that constituted a 
customs union and free movement of goods unrestrained by tariffs, quantitative 
restrictions or equivalent measures – albeit - among EEC member states only (Weiss 
and Kaupa, 2014; Thalassinos, 2007).  
 
Another important stage of integration was creating common market, which 
efficiently transmits the forces of economic liberalization (Smith, 2005). However, 
in 1980 charges were levelled against the Community that project to complete the 
single market might create what was called then “fortress Europe”. There were fears 
that, in contrast to reduction of trade restrictions among member states, European 
trade policy may represent more protectionism toward import from outside world 
(Weiss and Kaupa, 2014). Indeed, whoever studied the stages of integration in the 
classic Bela Balassa approach (Balassa, 1961) – at least partly reflected in the 
processes of Western European integration - notes that the transition to higher forms 
of integration is accompanied by a gradual elimination of internal discrimination 
(between members), while maintaining discrimination in external relations (with 
non-member countries). Allegations of discrimination by regional trade agreements 
are part of a broader discussion as whether regionalization is an opponent of 
globalization or its ally.  
 
There is no conclusion in this matter, nevertheless, assuming some external 
discrimination of regional integration groups, perhaps – as Samuelson stated - "some 
trade is better than no trade" (Samuelson, 1939). However, the fact that the EU is 
extending the range of free trade may be a good argument against the claim of 
“fortress Europe”. The EU is a world leader in terms of the number of trade 
agreements: at the end of December 2019, 42 agreements were in force (with 69 
countries – not counting overseas countries and territories). A chief example of 
expanding the free trade area is the agreement between the EU and Japan, that has 
created the largest free trade area with the EU, that accounts for almost one third of 
world’s GDP and relates to a population of over 639 million citizens. What is more, 
after consolidating internal market, EU has become a supporter of multilateral trade 
liberalization under the auspices of WTO (Hitiris, 2003).  
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Although neither the Treaty on European Union nor the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) mention protectionism directly, elimination of barriers 
is a goal of common market. Additionally, within common commercial policy, 
Union made a commitment in the Treaty “to the harmonious development of world 
trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade”. Aside from 
how these obligations are fulfilled, it is worth reflecting the role of institutions and 
member states in this respect. Common commercial policy as well as customs union 
and establishing of competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal 
market are areas of exclusive competences of the EU.  
 
However, the exclusive trade competence has not developed without controversy 
(Titievskaia, 2019). What is more, as EU member states differ in their economic 
interests, one can observe both protectionism by member states and EU bodies 
(Semeniuk, 2019). EU member states use for instance state aid to stimulate national 
businesses as not all kinds of state aid are forbidden by EU law (types listed on not 
so short list in Article 107 of TFEU that includes inter alia assistance to promote the 
economic development in areas where the standard of living is extremely low or 
areas with high underemployment). State assistance can range from a government 
loan guarantees, state loans to capital injection and equity stakes (including 
bailouts). One might find them in practice of EU member states. With the 
increasingly frequent attempts by member states to assert their protectionist interests 
by breaching the Single Market rules together with the Commission failure to fulfil 
its duty as guardian of this market, protection of barrier-free trade is no longer 
possible (Bolkestein and Gerken, 2015). Thus, both member states and EU 
institutions are responsible for protectionism, that can be not only directed inwards 
(within internal market) but also outward – in relation to the EU’s trade partners. In 
this paper, EU member states actions by them own as well as measures implemented 
by member states under the decision of EU institution are both studied. 
 
3. How to Measure Protectionism? 
 
Complex by its nature, protectionism is difficult to estimate. Plenty of different 
measures are undertaken including tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTM). With the 
reduction of the former, the latter may become more important as protectionism 
skillfully adapts to the prevailing conditions and countries use more sophisticated 
methods and measures (Sporek et al., 2019). One can find in UNCTAD 
classification (UNCTAD, 2019) nothing less than two hundred different non-tariff 
measures, including - inter alia - subsidies, rules of origin, labelling requirements, 
prohibition for security reasons, minimum import prices, and many, many other.  
 
Thus, being one - but not the only protectionism measure, tariffs should not be an 
exclusive spotlight of analysis. Focus on tariffs only, brings risk in misjudgment of 
protectionism, as countries often use tariffs to liberalize trade, but not so often when 
they want to introduce protective measures – preferring other tools (Figure 1). 
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Calculations based on tariffs are only in the risk of underestimation of degree of 
protectionism. For instance, an Overall Trade Restrictiveness Indices (OTRI) – 
methodology developed by Kee et al. (2013) is undoubtedly valuable, as tariffs are 
not subject to a simple assessment, considering merely different forms of tariff rates: 
ad-valorem, specific, compound, of which the last two are less transparent. 
However, OTRI is focused on tariffs and antidumping duties only (Kee et al., 2013).  
 
Figure 1. Interventions in world trade: harmful (left side) and liberalizing (right 
side), by the share of policy instrument between 2009 and 2019 (in per cent) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from Global Trade Alert Database (2020). 
 
What is striking, despite the reduction of world average applied tariff - average 
world MFN tariffs have declined by one percentage point between 2008 and 2018 to 
9 per cent (WTO, 2019b) - the interest in protectionism is on a rise. As these 
concerns might – to some degree - reflect state of affairs, thus one can observe 
abundance of protectionism indicators like Japanese Protectionism Indicator, US 
Monthly Trade Policy Uncertainty Index, China Trade Policy Uncertainty Index that 
reflect the frequency of articles in newspapers that contain one or more references to 
trade policy. However, such indicators based on the concerns on trade policy might 
be only a proxy for protectionism. 
 
Another approach in measuring protectionism is tracking the number of 
infringement proceedings of law relating to trade. Such study was carried by 
Semeniuk (2018) in relations to EU with the focus on the European Commission’s 
actions against a country that violates the rules of the common market. However, 
with high value of such studies, there are a few limitations. Firstly, the number of 
proceedings is influenced by institution effectiveness. Secondly, EU bodies are 
accused of not being free of protectionist tendencies themselves. In this case - 
protectionism introduced by EU institutions that is harmful to the EU’s trade 
partners - WTO is in charge. WTO tracks the number of ongoing dispute 
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proceedings, trade remedy actions and numbers of SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures) as well as Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) notifications, stating 
clearly however, that increased number of notifications do not automatically imply 
greater protectionism but rather enhance transparency regarding these measures 
(WTO, 2019a). 
 
4. Measuring Protectionism of the EU Member States: Methodology 
 
One of the aims of this paper is to present statistical analysis of protectionism based 
on more complex data that go beyond the average tariff rate to avoid the risk of 
underestimation of the actual degree of protectionism. Thus, statistical analysis is 
based on Global Trade Alert database, that provides comprehensive list of all diverse 
trade policy interventions - in case of EU member states both interventions 
introduced by the member states themselves, and interventions implemented by 
these states in response to the decisions of the relevant EU institution. A vital and 
precious feature of GTA is that it provides evaluation of each intervention that 
follows into three categories: red (the interventions that almost certainly discriminate 
against foreign commercial interests), amber (the interventions likely involve 
discrimination against foreign commercial interests) and green (the interventions that 
liberalize trade or improve the transparency of a relevant policy) (GTA, 2020). 
Although decision whether instrument shall be treated as a harmful one or 
liberalizing “is one of the attractive features of this initiative” (Evenett, 2019) the 
evaluation states clearly the character of trade instruments used.  
 
From the Global Trade Alert database, trade interventions of EU member states 
(including United Kingdom), that were introduced between 01/01/2009 and 
13/12/2019 were selected. For each country, a summary of interventions by three 
categories red, amber, and green have been made. Interventions within each category 
were analyzed considering their meaning corresponding to the nature of the 
category. The magnitudes of interventions in the 'red' and 'green' categories were the 
same as these interventions mean increased/decreased protectionism, respectively.  
 
However, the direction of “green” interventions was opposite to “red” interventions 
as they decrease protectionism. The magnitude of interventions in the 'amber' 
category has been reduced by half comparing to ‘red’ category, as they mean a 
possible increase in protectionism only. As the interventions had a different time 
range (from the inception until removal date), for the purpose of comparison, 
interventions that were in force for 10 years were given a weight of 1; interventions 
for a shorter time were given a proportionally lower weight. Within three categories, 
types of interventions were indicated (which shares in all interventions were above 
0.75%; the rest has been moved to the ‘other interventions’). Consequently, the list 
of examined types of interventions was received (Table 1). Due to the significant 
differentiation of the share of individual EU countries in world trade, reduction of 
this differentiation was required. The time-weighted interventions were divided by 
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the square and cube root of the country's share in world trade/export/import, 
depending on the type of intervention (Table 1, 3rd column).4 
 
Table 1. Types of interventions by share in total interventions and reference. 
Type of intervention 
Share in total 
interventions (in %) 
Reference 
Red 54.51  
D1 Antidumping 3.44 Share in world import 
E6 Tariff-rate quotas (TRQ) 3.85 Share in world import 
L Subsidies (excluding export subsidies under P7) 21.59 Share in world trade 
P7 Export subsidies 4.26 Share in world export 
Tariff measures 19.70 Share in world import 
Red: other interventions 1.67 Share in world trade 
Amber 2.34 
 
L Subsidies (excluding export subsidies under P7) 0.96 Share in world trade 
Amber: other interventions 1.38 Share in world trade 
Green 43.15 
 
E1 Non-automatic import-licensing procedures  1.86 Share in world import 
E6 Tariff-rate quotas (TRQ) 5.03 Share in world import 
L Subsidies (excluding export subsidies under P7) 7.30 Share in world trade 
P13 Licensing- or permit requirements to export 1.68 Share in world export 
P7 Export subsidies 1.02 Share in world export 
Tariff measures 25.72 Share in world import 
Green: other interventions 0.54 Share in world trade 
∑ 100%  
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from Global Trade Alert Database (2020). 
 
The result has become the basis for construction of synthetic measure that allows 
ranking countries by degree of protectionism. For this purpose, the TOPSIS 
(Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution) method was 
used. The lack of one comprehensive indicator of the degree of protectionism (DP) 
allows to consider it as an unobservable variable. Within a TOPSIS method, all red 
and amber variables have been recognized as stimulants, meaning that their high 
value should indicate a high degree of protectionism; green variables are 
destimulants as their high value reduces protectionism. 
 
 
4The shares of EU countries in trade are characterized by exceptionally large differences 
(asymmetry coefficients of each variable exceed 100%) and extraordinarily strong right-
sided asymmetry (classical asymmetry coefficient over 2). For this reason, the decision was 
made to calculate square roots and cube roots of this share. Initially, the authors considered 
logarithm, but it became troublesome as some countries had a low (below 1%) share of 
world trade, what gives a negative logarithm value. In case of square root, the variables 
were characterized by high diversity and strong right-sided asymmetry (variation at around 
70%; asymmetry at around 1.1). The use of the cube root allowed the variables to be "freed" 
from high differentiation and strong right-sided asymmetry (Marcinkiewicz, 2019). 
Coefficients of variation of about 45% and classical asymmetry coefficients of 0.75 were 
obtained. Both results of a synthetic measure, based on square root and cube root were 
presented (in table 2). One can notice only a slight difference between these results. 
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TOPSIS method proposed by Hwang and Yoon (1981) is about determining the 
distance of the considered objects from an ideal and anti-ideal solution. The result of 
the analysis is a synthetic indicator that creates a ranking of the examined objects. 
The best object is the one that has the shortest distance from the ideal solution and at 
the same time the largest from the anti-ideal solution. It is worth mentioning that 
TOPSIS is not the only method of objects’ ordering - the author of a similar method 
is Hellwig. The use of the Hellwig method to organize objects can be found in the 
works of Tarczyński (2002), Marcinkiewicz (2012), and Kilon and Marcinkiewicz 
(2014). The stages of research using the TOPSIS method are as follows: 
 
1. Construction of the data matrix regarding diagnostic variables: 
 
X = [xij] 
where: 
xij - value of j-diagnostic variable (j = 1, 2, …, 15), i – country (i = 1, 2, 3,…, 28). 
 
2. Normalization of values of diagnostic variables for stimulants and destimulants 
in the formula introduced by Roszkowska nad Filipowicz-Chomko (2017): 
 
 for stimulants (Red, Amber)                                                 (1)                                
   for destimulants (Green)                                                (2) 
 
3. Determination of weighting factors for indicators. For the purpose of the 
construction of the synthetic measure weights based on coefficients of variation were 
used, following Grabiński, Wydymus, Zeliaś (1989):  
 
                                                                                                                 (3) 
 
where: 
 – coefficient of variation of the j-variable 
wj – weight of each variable 
then: 
                                                                                                             (4) 
 
In addition, in the case of Amber variables (due to their potential impact on 
protectionism) their importance was reduced (weight 0.5). 
 
4. Calculation of the Euclidean distance for each country to the ideal solution, 
according to the formula introduced by Roszkowska, Filipowicz-Chomko (2016):  
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                                                                              (5) 
 
                                                                              (6) 
 
where: 
 = (1, 1 …, 1) – distance to ideal solution (protectionism)5,  
 = (0,0 ,…, 0) – distance to negative solution (zero protectionism). 
 
5. Calculation of the value of the synthetic measure for each country and ranking, 
according to formula proposed by Hwang, Yoon (1981): 
                                        
                                                                                                                 (7) 
6. Results and Discussion 
 
The values of the synthetic measure of DP were calculated for each EU member 
state and, on this basis, countries were ranked. The obtained results are presented in 
Table 2. Both results regarding differentiation of countries’ share in in world 
trade/export/import respectively (see 4th footnote) were presented. Both results are 
highly convergent. A correlation coefficient regarding the value of synthetic measure 
is 0.99 and regarding ranking position is 0.98. 
 
Table 2. Ranking of EU countries in terms of DP 










Germany 0.754 1 Germany 0.757 1 
United Kingdom 0.417 2 United Kingdom 0.488 2 
Luxembourg 0.307 3 Luxembourg 0.337 3 
Malta 0.294 4 Malta 0.325 4 
Italy 0.280 5 Italy 0.316 5 
Latvia 0.274 6 Latvia 0.300 8 
Sweden 0.271 7 Sweden 0.307 6 
Slovakia 0.270 8 Slovakia 0.303 7 
Slovenia 0.268 9 Slovenia 0.295 10 
Poland 0.263 10 Poland 0.292 11 
Bulgaria 0.260 11 Bulgaria 0.297 9 
Cyprus 0.259 12 Cyprus 0.284 14 
Hungary 0.258 13 Hungary 0.289 12 
Croatia 0.257 14 Croatia 0.283 15 
Estonia 0.255 15 Estonia 0.268 19 
 
5This does not indicate positive or negative assessment of the feature; ideal solution indicates 
only the maximum intensity. 
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Greece 0.251 16 Greece 0.281 16 
Czechia 0.248 17 Czechia 0.288 13 
Romania 0.245 18 Romania 0.278 18 
Finland 0.244 19 Finland 0.279 17 
Portugal 0.242 20 Portugal 0.257 23 
Lithuania 0.240 21 Lithuania 0.266 20 
France 0.231 22 France 0.266 21 
Spain 0.230 23 Spain 0.265 22 
Ireland 0.223 24 Ireland 0.251 27 
Denmark 0.220 25 Denmark 0.254 25 
Austria 0.209 26 Austria 0.255 24 
Belgium 0.192 27 Belgium 0.251 26 
Netherlands 0.171 28 Netherlands 0.235 28 
Note: *cube root of the country's share in world trade/export/import  
** square root of the country's share in world trade/export/import  
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from Global Trade Alert Database (2020). 
 
Germany was found to have the highest level of DP in the years 2009-2019, 
followed by United Kingdom. The results are consistent with the ranking of the top 
ten protectionist countries worldwide that includes two European countries: 
Germany (fourth place), and UK - tenth place (Semeniuk, 2019). Furthermore, 
Germany was on the list of ten topmost discriminatory countries ranked by the share 
of sectors affected (8th globally, 1st in the EU) and trading partners affected (8th 
globally, 3rd in the EU) (Evenett, 2009).  
 
The position of United Kingdom in ranking might be perceived in the light of the 
Brexit vote in the UK that demonstrated increasing skepticism in UK on 
international interference with its domestic policies. United Kingdom’s political 
leaders’ vocal opposition to the multilateral trade system of which the UK (together 
with United States) used to be the foremost proponents – was a surprise to many 
scientists (Williams, 2019). It follows that, the results of the study regarding the 
most protectionist EU member states correspond to a hypothesis of regime 
transformation, according to which, developed countries that face competition from 
countries producing substitutes with different factor proportion (it is mainly about 
low labour costs) might become more protectionist (Aggarwal, 2018).  
 
On the other hand, The Netherlands and Belgium had the lowest DP value, ranked 
respectively 28th and 27th. The ranking position of The Netherlands is not surprising, 
bearing in mind that this country together with other EU countries formed the New 
Hanseatic League – a coalition of states that advocates a free-trade oriented 
Eurozone (Lewicki, 2019). In some sectors, The Netherlands relies almost entirely 
on imports of semi products necessary for Dutch production (like cocoa beans for 
chocolate production). Protectionism and higher resource prices could affect its 
competitiveness (Weterings et al., 2013). The results of a study indicate that the 
value of synthetic measure in case of most countries was in the range between 0.2 - 
0.3. What is more, there are no extreme cases, this is, commercial policy of no EU 
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member states could be defined as purely protectionist or purely liberal one (in such 




European Union is an important player in the world trade, being the most important 
partner for dozens of economies around the world. Although, much effort has been 
made since the European Economic Community regarding limitation of trade 
barriers, yet “the victory is never total” (Baldwin, 2000). Protectionism is still 
present in the EU, albeit to varying degrees in EU member states.  
 
The aim of the paper was to reveal this differentiation by proposing methodology 
that allows ranking countries in this respect. In the light of results, EU member states 
are not much diverse when it comes to applying trade measures. The rationale 
behind this is that a plenty of measures are implemented by all member states within 
common commercial policy. What make a difference are national measures 
undertaken by each country (like government loan guarantees or bailouts).  
 
However, EU member states do not impose protectionist measures only, but they 
also introduce actions toward trade liberalization (like tax reliefs). In our study, both 
protectionist as well as liberalizing measures were taken into consideration, as to 
reveal the whole picture of the trade policy. To reach this goal all measures must be 
considered, what might be a challenge, as countries use plenty of different kinds of 
actions that go far beyond changes in tariffs only. Owing to access to GTA database, 
this barrier was overcome. Once the data were gathered, the TOPSIS methods could 
be used.  
 
Authors of this study are aware that the protectionism is a complex, 
multidimensional phenomenon, and application of TOPSIS method is a proposal of 
synthetic measure not panacea that solves all issues regarding trade policy. Many 
questions are still left behind concerning – inter alia - the causes and consequences 
of protectionism in international trade. Notwithstanding, in authors’ view, an 
approach presented in this paper, with the application of TOPSIS method, allows for 
a comparison of the degree of protectionism between countries and their 
classification in this respect.  
 
The study was focused on EU Member States, but the methodology is universal and 
allows comparison of other countries, in further studies. What is more, dynamic 
approach can be also considered. In our paper, over 10-year period was studied as to 
present path of trade policy. Still, analysis for selected years could be also valuable, 
showing shifts in trade policy that affect international trade. Whereas this trade is 
mutually beneficial, benefits might be achieved provided that the country is not 
excluded from international trade – by protectionist measures. 
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